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Abstract
We analyse the impact of globalization on child labour and adult unemployment. In a
dual economy setting, our model incorporates  child labour in a rural region, unskilled
and skilled labour in both regions, and urban unemployment. The interregional move-
ment of unskilled and skilled labour leads to diﬀerent outcomes from the existing literature
on child labour : ⒜ foreign direct investment decreases child labour when an urban
manufacturing sector is unskilled labour intensive compared to a rural agriculture sector ;
and ⒝ consumer boycott decreases child labour and urban adult unemployment when
unskilled labour is substitute to skilled labour in the urban sector.
JEL Classiﬁcation : J13, O10, R23
Key words : child labour, dual economy, unemployment, foreign direct investment, con-
sumer boycott
 Introduction
Child labour is one of unsolved development issues. The recent ILO estimate reports
that about one fourth of children aged from 5 to 17 in developing countries were engaged
in child labour under hazardous working conditions in 2012 (ILO 2013). As well as moral
appeal from images that small children are economically and socially exploited, child labour
does have substantial impacts on economic development through stagnated human capital
accumulation and expansive inequality in living standards and opportunities. On 25 Septem-
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ber 2015, responding to international calls for actions to eliminate child labour, the United
Nations and its member states envisaged to end all forms of child labour by 2025 in the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015, Goal 8, Target 7).
In response to this global agenda, more economic research on child labour is demanded.
Theoretical analysis on child labour started in Basu and Van (1998). They modelled the
decision on supply of child labour in a household collective decision model, where a head of
household decides the working hours of its child by balancing the income the child brings
in and the moral cost of sending the child to work. Several works has developed with this
model, such as Di Maio and Fabbri (2013). On the other hand, Dinopoulos and Zhao
(2007) focused on the demand side of child labour. In their dual economy model, an
increase in urban wage, which is triggered by trade liberalization or foreign direct
investment into urban manufacturing sector, stimulates migratory inﬂows of skilled labour
to urban area. Since child labour (and unskilled labour) is complementary to skilled labour
and is employed only in the rural area in their model, this migration eﬀect always reduces
child labour.
Our model now incorporates two new aspects into Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007). The ﬁrst
aspect is to allow urban sector to employ unskilled labour who can move freely between
the two regions. In our three-input production technology, the relation between skilled and
unskilled labour in the urban sector can be complementary or substitute, leading to
diﬀerent outcomes of the migration eﬀect from Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007). The second
aspect is to introduce urban unemployment of unskilled labour, enabling us to analyse both
child labour and adult unemployment at the same time.
We analyse the impact on child labour of foreign direct investment, consumer boycotts
and international labour migration. Foreign direct investment increases child labour when
an urban manufacturing sector is unskilled labour intensive compared to a rural agricul-
ture sector. In such situation, FDI attracts unskilled labour to the urban area more than
skilled labour. Since a substitution eﬀect between unskilled and child labour dominates a
complementarity eﬀect between skilled and child labour in the rural sector, FDI results in
an increase in child labour. In addition to an increased unemployment of unskilled labour,
FDI indeed deteriorates labour conditions in such case.
Consumer boycott on a child-labour tainted good, on the other hand, may improve labour
conditions. When unskilled labour is a substitute input to skilled labour in the urban sector,
consumer boycott decreases child labour and urban unemployment. A lower price of the
child-labour good leads to a lower wage of skilled labour, expanding the employment of
skilled labour in the urban sector, and reducing that of unskilled labour. The latter lowers
the expected wage for unskilled adult workers in the urban area and then decreases the
migratory inﬂow to the urban area. Thus, child labour and unemployment decreases since
unskilled labour stay in the rural area. This is an opposite result to the existing literature
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on child labour showing that consumer boycotts are harmful.
Lastly, the impact on labour markets from international migration is all absorbed in the
rural area in our setting. Thus, urban unemployment does not change. Child labour
decreases when unskilled workers migrate, while it increases when skilled workers
migrate, due to the production technology of the rural sector.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up a theoretical model with
two sectors and four inputs, allowing free sectoral movement of skilled and unskilled
labour. The third section describes the equilibrium. The fourth section evaluates the
impact on child labour of globalization, notably foreign investment, consumer boycott by
other countries, and international migration. The last section make a conclusion and
proposes future research.
 Model
We construct a small open economy model with urban and rural regions. There are four
inputs in the economy : skilled labour, unskilled labour, child labour, and capital. The ﬁrst
two can move freely between the regions, but the others are region-speciﬁc. The urban
region produces a manufactured good by using skilled labour, unskilled labour and capital.
There, child labour is strictly prohibited. Further, the minimum wage for unskilled is set to
above the market-clearing level, so that there exists unemployment of unskilled labour in
the urban region. On the other hand, the rural region produces an agricultural good with
skilled, unskilled, and child labour since it is away from the reach of governmentʼs
monitoring. The wage rate for unskilled is ﬂexible in this region so that unskilled labour in
the rural region is in full employment.
. Urban Manufacturing Sector
The urban region accommodates H

of skilled labour, L

of unskilled labour, and K of
capital. It produces the manufacturing good with the production function M H，L，K ,
in which H, L, and K are the manufacturing sectorʼs demand for skilled, unskilled
labour, and capital respectively. We assume that M · is increasing, strictly quansi-
concave, and homogeneous of degree 1 in H, L, K. Setting the price of the manufactur-
ing good to one, the proﬁt function of the sector is given by
π=M H，L，K −wH−wL−rK ⑴
where w is the wage rate for skilled labour, which is common in both urban and rural
region due to the migration adjustment, w is the minimum wage for unskilled, and r is the
rental rate of capital. w is set to above the market-clearing wage (and the rural wage rate
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for unskilled labour) so that the full employment of unskilled labour in the urban area is
not achieved. Whereas the other two are in full employment.
The proﬁt maximizing conditions are given by, evaluatedat H=H

and K=K,
MH
，L，K =w, ⑵
MH
，L，K =w, ⑶
MH
，L，K =r, ⑷
where M is the ﬁrst derivative of M · with respect to the respective variable
=H，L，K . These conditions yield H(w ; w，K ), L(w ; w，K ), and r(w ; w，K ).
From total diﬀerentiation on ⑵ and ⑶, we have

M M
M M
∂H
∂K
∂L
∂K
=−M−M  ⑸
Further, from the assumption of the constant-return-to-scale production function, we have

M M
M M
H

K
L
K
=−M−M  ⑹
From ⑸ and ⑹, we have
∂H
∂K
=
H

K
>0, ⑺
∂L
∂K
=
L
K
>0. ⑻
Thus, the marginal impact of an increase in K on other inputs are proportional. In other
words, foreign investment increases H

and L proportionally since it must keep the left
hand side of ⑶ equal to w. In addition, it does not change the rental rate for capital at all
from ⑷ since M is homogeneous of degree 0.
From diﬀerentiation on conditions ⑵ and ⑶ with respect to H, L and w, we have

M M
M M
dH

dL =
1
0dw. ⑼
The determinant of the matrix is given by detM=MM−MM>0 due to the second
maximization condition. Applying Clamerʼs rule, we have
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∂H
∂w
=
M
detM
<0 ⑽
∂L
∂w
=
−M
detM
⑾
A marginal increase in w decreases the employment of skilled labour. However, how
demand in the employment of unskilled labour responds to the increase depends on the
relationship between skilled and unskilled labour in production of manufacturing goods.
Here is a lemma, which is crucial to the result of our analysis.
Lemma 1 When M is negative, skilled and unskilled labour are substitute so that
∂H/∂L<0. Otherwise, they are complementary so that ∂H
/∂L>0.
When the marginal product of unskilled labour is diminishing as skilled labour increases,
we say that they are substitute in production of the manufacturing good. Meanwhile, the
marginal product of unskilled labour is increasing as more skilled labour is put in, they are
complementary.
. Rural Agriculture Sector
The rural agriculture sector can hire child labour in production. Following Dinopoulos
and Zhao (2007), we introduce the nutritional eﬃciency wage for child labour. We assume
that each childʼs productivity relies on amount and nutrition of food consumed. The
nutritional eﬃciency function is deﬁned as hw, where w is the wage rate for child
labour, or the value of food for children to attain enough nutrition. It has the following
properties : hw=0 if w<w which is some positive level of w, h′w=dhw/dw>0
and h″w=d

hw/dw
<0, and it is bounded from above
1)
. By choosing the proper
level of w, the agriculture sector can maximize its proﬁt.
There are H

of skilled labour, L

of unskilled labour, and C of child labour in the rural
region. The production function for the agriculture sector is given by AH，L
+γhwC, where H, L, C are the agriculture sectorʼs demand for skilled, unskilled,
and child labour respectively. We assume that A· is increasing, strictly quansiconcave,
and homogeneousof degree1in inputs. γ∈0，1 is the constant adult-equivalent scale so
that one unit of child labour is equivalent to γ unit of adult labour without any
consideration on nutritional eﬃciency. Please note that unskilled labour and child labour
are perfect substitute, while these are complementary to skilled labour from the form of
the production function.
The proﬁt of the agriculture sector is deﬁned as
π=pAH，L+γ
wC−wH−wL−wC ⑿
where p is the relative price of agricultural good measured by the manufacturing good,
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and w is the wage rate for rural unskilled labour which is ﬂexible to achieve the full
employment of the unskilled in the rural region. The wage rate for rural skilled labour is
equal to w due to the migration adjustment.
Assuming C∈0，C, we have the proﬁt maximizing conditions such as, evaluated at
H=H

and L=L

,
pAH
，L+γhwC=w, ⒀
pAH
，L+γhwC=w, ⒁
pAH
，L+γhwCγhw=w, ⒂
pAH
，L+γhwCγh′w=1. ⒃
Conditions ⒂ and ⒃ determine the proﬁt maximizing wage for children w*, which
satisﬁes
h′w* =
hw* 
w*
. ⒄
Furthermore, from conditions ⒁ and ⒃, we have the equilibrium wage for unskilled labour
w* such as
w*=
1
γh′w* 
. ⒅
Note that w* and w* are determined only by the form of h· and γ.
Now, let us deﬁne the skilled and unskilled labour used for one unit of production as
a≡
H

Y
, ⒆
a≡
L
+γhw* C
Y
, ⒇
where Y is the level of production. We can rewrite conditions ⒀ and ⒁ as
pAa，a=w, 4
pAa，a=w*. 5
These yield aw ; w*  and aw ; w* . From 4, we have the equilibrium wage for
skilled labour w*, which satisﬁes
pA(aw*，w* ，aw*，w*  )=w*. 6
The ﬁrst derivative of w* with respect to p is given by, from 6,
dw*
dp
=A>0. 7
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As the relative price of agricultural decreases, the wage rate for skilled workers decreases.
Lastly, from ⒆ and ⒇, we have
H
=a*Y, 8
L
+γrw* C=a*Y, 9
where a*≡aw*，w*  and a*≡aw*，w* 
: Equilibrium
We have eleven unknowns r，w，w，w，L，L
，L，H，H, C，Y. First,
w* is determined by equation ⒄, and then equation ⒅ gives w*. Equation 6 yields w*,
which gives r*≡r(w*，w，K ), L*≡L(w*，w，K ), and H

*≡H(w*，w，K )
from ⑵ ―⑷.
Second, migration of unskilled labour would stop when the expected wage of the urban
region equates the wage of the rural region, or wL*/L
=w*. This gives us the
equilibrium number of urban unskilled labour as
L

*=
w
w*
L*. ;
Next, the economy-wide endowment of skilled and unskilled labour must equate the
sectoral allocation of both labors such as L

*+L=L for the unskilled labour market, and
H

*+H=H for the skilled labour market, where L and H are the economy-wide
endowment of skilled and unskilled labour respectively, and H

*≡H(w*，w，K ).
These yield
L

*=L−L*， <
H

*=H−H*． =
From 8 and =, we have the equilibrium level of total production of the agricultural good,
such as
Y*=H

*/a*. >
Lastly, inserting > into 9, we have the equilibrium number of child labour in the
economy as
C*=
1
γhw* 
θH

*−L* , ?
where θ≡a*/a*. Child labour increases when the employment of skilled labour expands
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in the agricultural sector, while it reduces when the employment of unskilled labour
decreases. Now, we all the equilibrium values of the eleven unknowns.
For the latter part of this paper, we deﬁne the unemployment of urban unskilled labour
as
U*=L*−L*=
w−w*
w*
L*, @
which is positive if w−w*>0. In our model, an increase in the employment in the urban
region increases urban unemployment. This occurs that the expansion of employment of
unskilled labour in the urban region excessively drives households from the rural to the
urban regions, and it cannot fully absorb the increase of unskilled labour available in
market.
A Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze the impact of globalization on child labour C* and adult
unemployment U*. Speciﬁcally, we consider foreign direct investment to increase the
endowment of capital, consumer boycott lowering the relative price of the agricultural
good, and the inﬂow of skilled and unskilled labour.
. Foreign indirect investment
Here, we consider foreign investment as an exogenous increase in K. From diﬀerentiation
on ? with respect to K, we have
∂C
∂K
=
1
γhw θ
∂H*
∂K
−
∂L*
∂K ，
=
1
γhw −θ
∂H*
∂K
+
w
w*
∂L*
∂K 
=
L*
γhwK −
θ
θ
+
w
w* , B
where θ≡L*/H

*. For the transformation from the ﬁrst to the second lines in B, we
use ⑺ and ⑻. The sign of the the bracket of equation B determines the impact of foreign
investment on child labour. Note that θ/θ implies the relative intensity of unskilled
labour to skilled labour between sectors. We have our ﬁrst proposition as follows.
Proposition 1 Foreign investment increases child labour when the manufacturing sector use
unskilled labour more intensively than the agriculture sector.
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Proof When the manufacturing sector is more unskilled-labour intensive than the agricul-
tural sector, θ/θ is less than unity. Meanwhile, the second part is always more than
unity since w−w*>0. Thus, the sign of the bracket is positive, and ∂C/∂K>0. □
Foreign investment may increase child labour. This is a contrasting result to Dinopoulos
and Zhao (2007), in which foreign investment increases skilled labour employed in the
manufacturing sector, and then decreases child labour, which is complementary to skilled
labour in the agricultural sector. In our model, foreign investment reallocates not only
skilled labour but also unskilled labour from the agriculture sector to the manufacturing
sector. When the manufacturing sector is more unskilled-labour intensive, the reallocation
of skilled labour from the rural sector takes place in a smaller scale than that of unskilled
labour. Therefore, child labour may increase since it is substitute to unskilled labour in the
agriculture sector.
On the other hand, the impact of foreign direct investment becomes ambiguous when
the manufacturing sector is more skilled-labour intensive than the agricultural sector. In an
extreme case of L*=0, child labour decreases due to foreign direct investment. This is
consistent with Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007). However, allowing the manufacturing sector
to hire unskilled workers, we may have an opposite result.
The impact of foreign direct investment on adult unemployment is given by
∂U*
∂K
=
w−w*
w*
∂L*
∂K
>0. F
Growth in the employment of the manufacturing sector due to foreign direct investment
induces more unskilled labour to move to the urban region. However, the inﬂow of the
unskilled outpaces the labour absorption by the manufacturing sector. As a result, foreign
direct investment increases urban unemployment of adult unskilled labour.
. Consumer boycott
A decrease in p can be interpreted as consumer boycott on agricultural goods. The
impact of consumer boycott on child labour is given by
∂C*
∂p
=
1
γhw*  
∂θ
∂p
H

*+θ
∂H*
∂p
−
∂L*
∂p ，
=
1
γhw*  
∂θ
∂p
H

*−θ
∂H*
∂w*
∂w*
∂p
+
w
w*
∂L*
∂w*
∂w*
∂p 
=
1
γhw*  
∂θ
∂p
H

*−
1
detM θM+
w
w*
M  ∂w*∂p  G
Proposition 2 Consumer boycott decreases child labour when unskilled labour is substitute to
skilled labour in the manufacturing sector.
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Proof First, we have ∂θ/∂p=−M/M>0 from pMθ=w*. Then, ∂w*/∂p>0, and
M<0 and det M>0 due to the second condition for maximization. Lastly, when unskilled
labour is substitute to skilled labour, we must have M<0. Thus, ∂C*/∂p>0. □
Consumer boycott aﬀects child labour though three eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is a change in
the ratio of unskilled labour to skilled labour employed in the rural sector, or θΑ. In our
setting, a decrease in p lowers θ, implying a relative decrease in demand for unskilled
labour and then child labour.
The second eﬀect comes from the migration of skilled labour. A decrease in w due to
consumer boycott expands the employment of skilled labour in the urban manufacturing
sector. Since child labour is complementary to skilled labour in the agriculture sector, it
lowers the use of child labour.
The ﬁnal eﬀect stems from the reallocation of unskilled labour between sectors. It
depends on the relationship between skilled and unskilled labour in the manufacturing
sector. When skilled labour is substitute to unskilled in production the manufacturing good,
a decrease in w due to consumer boycott decreases the employment of unskilled labour in
the urban manufacturing sector. This reallocates unskilled labour from the urban to the
rural regions by lowering the expected wage of unskilled in the urban region. This
reallocation lowers child labour employed in the agriculture sector since child labour is
substitute to unskilled. In this case, all the three eﬀects above causes a decrease in child
labour, and we have Proposition 1 : consumer boycott decreases child labour. Of course,
when skilled labour is complementary to unskilled in the manufacturing sector, consumer
boycott increases the employment of unskilled labour in the manufacturing, and child
labour through this path.
Meanwhile, consumer boycott has the substantial impact on adult unemployment in the
urban region. Diﬀerentiating equation @ with respect to p gives
∂U*
∂p
=
w−w*
w*
∂L*
∂w*
∂w*
∂p
. I
From this equation, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consumer boycott decreases unemployment of unskilled labour when unskilled
labour is substitute to skilled labour. Whereas, it increases unemployment of unskilled labour
when unskilled labour is complementary to skilled labour.
Proof The sign of ∂U*/∂p hinges on the sign of ∂L*/∂w*. When unskilled labour is
substitute to skilled labour, ∂L*/∂w*>0 and ∂U*/∂p>0. Otherwise, ∂L*/∂w*<0 and
∂U*/∂p<0. □
The impact of consumer boycott on child labour and adult unemployment gravely hinges
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on the relationship between skilled and unskilled labour in production of the manufacturing
good. A decrease in w due to consumer boycott increases the employment of skilled
labour in the manufacturing sector. When unskilled labour is substitute to skilled labour,
the employment of unskilled labour decreases in response to the expansion of that of
skilled labour. At the same time, it reduces the expected wage for unskilled to live in the
urban region, and reduces the urban population of unskilled labour. Since the latter eﬀect
is larger than the former, the level of unemployment decreases.
On the other hand, when unskilled labour is complementary to skilled labour, consumer
boycott increases adult unemployment. In some cases, consumer boycott may result in a
reduction in child labour and an expansion in adult unemployment
2)
. Thus, too much
emphasis on child labour reduction deteriorates the employment of unskilled adult labour.
This is not seen in Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007).
. International labour migration
In the era of global movement of workers, migration would aﬀect labour markets and
then return to labour in destination countries. Now, we evaluate the impact of international
migration of unskilled and skilled workers on child labour. The migration of labour in the
dual economy aﬀect child labour in the following ways.
Proposition 4 International migration of unskilled labour decreases child labour, while that
of skilled labour increases child labour.
Proof International migration of unskilled and skilled labour is modeled as an increases in
L and H. Diﬀerentiating equation ? with respect to L and H gives
∂C*
∂L
=−
1
rhw* 
∂L
∂L
<0, K
∂C*
∂H
=
1
rhw* 
θ
∂H
∂H
=>0. L
Thus an increase in L decreases C*, while that in H increases C*. □
It turns out that the migration impact is all absorbed in the rural region through
changes in labour demandintherural sector. The migratory inﬂow of unskilled labour
substitutes child labour employed in the rural sector due to a lower wage for unskilled
labour. Meanwhile, the inﬂow of skilled labour lowers the wage of the skilled and thus
expands its employment in the rural sector. Since child labour is assumed to be comple-
mentary to skilled labour in agriculture, the inﬂow results in increasing child labour.
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M Concluding Remarks
This paper analyses how globalisation aﬀects the incidence of child labour and urban
adult unemployment, which are widely observed phenomena in the developing world.
Extending Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007), we construct a dual economy model with free
movement of unskilled and skilled labour. Interregional migration leads to diﬀerent out-
comes from the existing child labour literature, depending on the technological attributes of
urban manufacturing.
The ﬁrst outcome is that foreign direct investment reduces child labour when an urban
manufacturing sector uses more intensively unskilled labour than a rural agriculture sector.
This happens mainly because foreign direct investment attracts more unskilled labour than
skilled to the unskilled-labour intensive sector, resulting in more employment of child
labour in the rural sector due to its substitutability to unskilled labour. Secondly, contrast
to the existing literature, we ﬁnd that consumer boycott improves the situation of child
labour and urban adult unemployment when unskilled labour is a substitute input to
skilled labour in urban manufacturing. Consumer boycott against child-labour-tainted goods
reallocates unskilled labour to the rural sector, due to lower wage of the skilled and
substitutability of unskilled and skilled labour in the urban sector. Thus, child labour
decreases. The last outcome is rather straight forward : the increase in endowments of
unskilled (skilled) labour reduces (increases) child labour due to its substitutability
(complementarity) to each type of adult labour.
As concluding remarks, we point out possible extensions of this research. First of all,
this analysis considers only the demand side of child labour. Like Basu and Van (1998),
the supply side of child labour is also of importance and needs to be incorporated to make
rigorous assessment for the impact of globalisation on child labour. The household collec-
tive decision model could be an option. Secondly, modeling consumer boycotts is required.
In our model. we consider consumer boycott as a decrease in an agricultural good. In
reality, however, consumer boycotts are accompanied with a labeling scheme. In this
respect, the heterogeneous pattern of child labour employment in agriculture should be
modeled.
Notes
1） According to Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007), the last restriction assures the existence of a
nutritional eﬃciency wage.
2） When the complementarity of unskilled to skilled labour is at a reasonable degree, the sign of
G becomes positive while the sign of I is negative.
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